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INTRODUCTION
A logical construction for the Symposium on the Priority of Se-
cured Debt would have been an introduction to highlight the issues,
followed by a panel of commentators supporting full priority, a panel
opposing full priority, and a panel discussing the optimal implementa-
tion for any constraints on priority. The difficulty, however, is that
while the attack on full priority is quite spirited, the defense of full
priority is hedged in qualifications. Commercial lenders and their
lawyers are willing to come out foursquare for full priority for secured
creditors, but the academic analysis has been very different in tone.
Most academic supporters carefully note the limited evidence on
which a conclusion can be based, often describing themselves as ag-
nostic or waiting for the empirical studies before they commit to a
position on full priority.'
j- Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Karen
Bustamante, Harvard Law School, Class of 1997, for her valuable research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Importance of Piority, 82 CORmLL L. REv. 1420, 1420-
21 (1997) (urging caution because of the indirectness of priority rights' benefits); Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter 11 Too Favorable to Debtors? Evidence from
Abroad, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1532, 1533-36 (1997) (comparing evidence between reorgani-
zations in Finland and in the United States); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Fi-
nancing, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1436, 1437-38 (1997) (displaying ambivalence about whether
a priority regime does enhance social welfare); William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist and
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Does this mean that partial priority has triumphed and secured
creditors will not be permitted to expand their reach under the next
version of Article 9? Not quite. As Professors Harris and Mooney state
in the opening paragraph of their Article, "As of yet, however, none of
the subordination proponents has addressed [the empirical] ques-
tions in any detail."2 Until that lucky day, the revision process evi-
dently proceeds apace to make Article 9 safer for secured creditors,
ensuring that secured creditors sweep in more of the debtors' assets
and leave less for the unsecured creditors.3
Academics who ply their scholarly trade in the field of commer-
cial law often debate in two simultaneous worlds: the abstract world of
ideas where theoretical dominance spells success, and the very real
world of law reform, where debates result in code provisions that gov-
ern billions of transactions. This Symposium provides a wonderful ex-
ample of what happens when those worlds collide.
In the past few months, three events have occurred simultane-
ously: the lack of theoretical consensus for full priority has become
prominently exposed, the absence of empirical data has obviated the
ability to make any concrete evaluation of the costs and benefits of
secured credit, and the headlong push to enlarge on every scintilla of
priority for secured creditors has intensified. The confluence of these
events creates the focus of my Article-policy decisions in a world of
disputed theories and imperfect information.
I
BASELINE RuLEs AND PRIvATE D-ALs
UCC priority questions involve an easily understood transaction.
Whether the discussion is about abstract letters, as in Professor
Schwartz's work, or specifically identified groups who cannot adjust
their lending practices, as in Mr. Klee's work, the deal under scrutiny
is the same. In its baldest terms, contractual priority permits the
Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL
L. R v. 1511, 1529-30 (1997) (raising issues of distributive fairness).
Some academics are supporters of full priority. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the
Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REv. 2179, 2179-80 (1994) ("[I]t is easy to show that
secured lending has at least the potential to create social good."); Steven L. Harris &
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices
Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2021-22 (1994) (arguing that "[tihe law should not impair
the ability of debtors to secure as much or as little of their debts with as much or as little of
their existing and future property as they deem appropriate"); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DuxE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 1997).
2 Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and
Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. Rxv.
1349, 1349 (1997).
3 The carve out, Professor Harris announced at the Symposium, is "dead in the
water."
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debtor and one lender to get together and agree that, in the event of
complete collapse, a third party will bear the biggest share of the
losses.
This legal arrangement differs dramatically from the two schemes
imposed elsewhere in collection law-the state-law scheme that fosters
a one-at-a-time collection process which rewards the diligent creditor,
and the bankruptcy system that embraces the ideal of equity-is-equal-
ity. Article 9 is the best-known example of permitting two parties to
agree by contract not only to change their own collection rights, but
to change the collection rights of third parties who are not present.
Ordinarily, when two parties try to alter the rights of third parties
who are absent from the negotiations and who are unable to refuse
such altered treatment, the law says "no." Parties may barter away
their own rights, but they cannot give away the rights of those who do
not consent to such treatment. In the case of personal property, it was
not until the sweeping reforms of Article 9 were adopted in the 1960s
that parties could reliably and inexpensively negotiate for the reduced
collection rights of third parties in the event of a financial collapse.4
Why would the law take such an extraordinary step to permit two
parties to negotiate away the rights of a third party that was not pres-
ent at the negotiation table? The proposed answers have differed,5
4 See generally Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Ment-
schikoffi The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 351, 374-75
(1983) (describing the confused state of the law prior to Article 9).
5 See DOUGLAS G. BAID & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
SECURry INTEREs IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 316-29 (2d ed. 1987) (criticizing as too simplis-
tic the conventionaljustification-facilitating the borrowing of money-for granting prior-
ity to secured claims); Barry E. Adler, An Equiy-Agency Solution to the Bankrupty-Priority
Puzz 22J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 93 (1993) (concluding that current theories show how secured
credit efficiently reduces management's opportunity to take excessive risks with a debtor's
assets); Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes
and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 13, 33 (1993) (asserting that creating greater
efficiency for only one of the participants in a transaction does not justify secured credit);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 934 (1996) (demonstrating that the rule of full priority
"causes excessive use of security interests, reduces the incentive of firms to take adequate
precautions and choose appropriate investments, and distorts the monitoring arrange-
ments chosen by firms and their creditors"); James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan? :
Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L.
REV. 27, 64-67 (1991) (addressing the costs of security in light of debtor misbehavior);
Carlson, supra note 1, at 2213 (arguing that the rationality of secured lending is established
by ordinary price theory-security interests reduce risk and make credit available that
would otherwise not be extended); Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2047-66 (proposing
that secured creditors have property interests in their security interests); John Hudson, The
Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT'L Rxv. L. & ECON. 47, 53-55 (1995) (taking the position
that full priority allows a firm to continue to operate inefficiently); Thomas H. Jackson &
Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143,
1158 (1979) (arguing that "the economic utility of secured credit rests upon the assump-
tion that total monitoring costs can sometimes be reduced by giving certain creditors prior-
ity over others"); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
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and the debate continues apace, as this Symposium shows. Thejustifi-
cation for contractual priority remains, at best disputed, and at worst,
thoroughly debunked. Nonetheless, the real-world aspect of the de-
bate rears its head from time to time, and the world of reform and
modernization efforts does not leave time for the luxury of waiting for
a resolution to the theoretical debate. Article 9 is in use, the UCC
revision process is upon us, and it is imperative to decide how to
decide.
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 169-73 (1989)
(concluding that full priority encourages secured creditor misbehavior on the eve of bank-
ruptcy); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial
Law in a Vacuum of Fac4 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929, 941 (1985) (advocating a practical analysis
which leads to the observation that security is desirable because it is quick and offers many
procedural advantages); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 55-57 (1982) (asserting that the freeriding problem is solved when
unique monitoring tasks are assigned to secured creditors); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Un-
secured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1952-54, 1965 (1994) (proposing that the
"Article 9 filing system be redesigned to serve the information needs of all who are to be
bound by the secured creditor's [agreement]"); James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of
Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HA v. L. REv. 973, 977-79 (1983) (arguing that a secured
creditor does not acquire property rights deserving greater constitutional protection than
is accorded to contractual rights of an unsecured creditor); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests
and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-28 (1981) [here-
inafter Schwartz, Security Interests] (rejecting several common efficiency justifications for
security, including: reduction of monitoring costs, the value of secured debt as a signal,
the premise that properly staggered debt increases profits, the reduction of creditor uncer-
tainty, and the ability of security interests to shift risks from more to less risk-averse credi-
tors); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1051
(1984) (reiterating that the law's favorable treatment of secured debt is without plausible
support);James H. Scott,Jr., Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Reply, 34
J. FIN. 253, 257-58 (1979) (arguing that issuing secured debt affects shareholder wealth);
James H. Scott, Jr., Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structur4 32 J. FIN. 1, 9-12
(1977) (asserting that the issuance of secured debt can increase the total value of a firm);
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 967-70
(1986) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory] (asserting that Article 9's strength is that it has
chosen certainty over equity); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41
RUTGERS L. REv. 1067, 1103-07 (1989) (arguing that there is a social gain from secured
transactions); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225, 227 (1992) (stating that security is unnecessary "in perfect capital mar-
kets where lenders are risk neutral"); James J. White, EfficiencyJustifications for Personal Prop-
erty Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473, 475 (1984) (concluding that the Article 9 position is "the
most efficient, practical alternative under an economic system that recognizes and protects
private rights of ownership"); James J. White, The Recent Erosion of the Secured Creditor's Rights
Through Cases, Rules -and Statutory Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 53 Miss. L.J. 389, 424-26
(1983) (outlining constitutional concerns raised by the spectre of effectively eliminating a
creditor's existing rights in security); MichelleJ. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-
First and Other Priority Rules, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 550, 552-61 (1980) (pointing to the danger of
continued inefficient operation by a firm in a full priority regime).
[Vol. 82:13731376
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II
TiE POWER AND Limrrs OF EFFIrCIENcY ANALYSIS
The rhetoric of the debate over security interests is couched
largely in the language of economics. Will a priority scheme make
lending more efficient? Will it promote more lending? Will it cause
over-investment in risky projects? Will a modified priority scheme en-
courage greater internalization of risk? Do externalities caused by a
full priority scheme undercut any efficiencies it might produce?
There can be no doubt that economic analysis provides a valuable tool
in analyzing the implications of any rule in commercial law, including
a rule regarding the priority of secured debt.
Economists are, however, the first to note that using economic
analysis as a tool for understanding policy choices has its limits. At
many turns, the analysis depends heavily on empirical assumptions.
Without knowing the accuracy of the underlying assertions of fact, it is
impossible to know whether an abstract economic analysis is applica-
ble or not. The agnosticism expressed by a number of commentators
puts this limitation very much in plain sight.
Economists would point out a second constraint on the contribu-
tion an efficiency argument could make to policymaking decisions.
Economic analysis is well-suited to contribute to debates over alloca-
tive efficiency, but the tools of economic analysis are not nearly as
useful in dealing with questions of distributive efficiency. Methods to
produce expansion or contraction of credit are good subjects for de-
ductive debates; decisions to prefer banks over utility companies or
tort victims are not. Economic analysis can help inform debates about
distributive issues by pointing out, for example, that commercial lend-
ers are able to spread risks in a way utility companies or tort victims
cannot, or that reallocation would be unworkable. Nonetheless, the
ultimate normative question about preference for one group over an-
other in the distribution of limited assets is beyond the expertise these
tools provide.
Debates over priority are not new. Professor Schwartz revived an
old debate in the newly discovered language of law and economics by
asking whether secured debt is efficient.6 In quick order, a cottage
industry of articles rising to the challenge or disputing its basic as-
sumptions arose.7
6 Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 5, at 3. Schwartz states:
[My] essay's principal conclusion, therefore, is that scholars and decision
makers should no longer regard as settled the question which bankruptcy
priority list is normatively preferable. Much more work must be done to
make compelling the efficiency defense of current law, yet normativejustifi-
cations for altering this law are also poorly developed.
Id.
7 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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In his delightful introduction8 to his Virginia Law Review article,
Professor LoPucki noted that economists spend a great deal of time
explaining why any rule that aims to redistribute wealth to the under-
dog would actually reduce wealth to everyone. 9 These economists ex-
plain the need for banks to be able to seize all the assets of a business
while the tort victims limp away with nothing, as based on allocative
efficiency. LoPucki comments: "Ah, to be exquisitely cruel but at the
same time efficient-what more could an economist ask of an
institution?"1 0
Although LoPucki does not identify it as such, he makes the point
that the economic rationality arguments for the efficiency of a system
that benefits those in power1 1 often trump the distributional impulses
that might affect policymakers. He notes that even noneconomically
oriented scholars often give up the idea of protection for the losers in
the priority game, as these scholars see how much good the secured
credit system does.1 2 These debaters often toss a bone to the under-
dogs through a warmed-over trickle-down theory, arguing that what is
good for secured creditors is good for all of America.13 In one form
8 "Delightful" to those who enjoy seeing someone poke fun at the economists-
although maybe not so delightful for the economists.
9 LoPucki, supra note 5, at 1888-89.
10 Id. at 1889.
11 Id. Note that this argument is different from the argument that Professor LoPucki
advances in his piece, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996), and that Professor Baird
echoes in his piece, The Importance of Priori, supra note 1. LoPucki argues that any form of
liability can be avoided by a clever and well-advised party, LoPucki, supra, at 4-5, and Baird
points out examples of ways that the debtor and one creditor could cut out a distribution
to unsecured creditors even in a partial priority system, Baird, supra note 1, at 1423-25.
The arguments are important and worth attention, and are addressed later in this Article.
However, in any case, the arguments are not justifications for making normative decisions
based on the inapplicable principles of allocative efficiency.
12 LoPucki, supra note 5, at 1888-89; see also Kripke, supra note 5, at 961. According to
Kripke, "[D]ebtors and their suppliers are both advantaged by a system that permits the
debtors' typically insufficient capital to be supplemented by financial lending practices
based on security." Id.
13 SeeJackson & Kronman, supra note 5, at 1156. The authors state:
If we assume that the sum of all parties' monitoring costs depends on the
priority of creditor claims, there are likely to be some situations in which
everyone concerned, including the debtor, will be better off if the interests
of certain creditors are subordinated to those of others than they would be
if all creditors were given equal priority.
Id.; see Scott, supra note 1, at 1456. He states:
In sum, it is fair to conclude that a regime that privileges secured credit may
enhance social welfare and that the scheme of priorities institutionalized in
Article 9 is roughly congruent with plausible explanations of the compara-
tive advantages of secured financing over other financing alternatives.
Id.; see also Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARv. L. REv. 625,
649 (1997) (stating that granting collateral enhances the lender's ability to restrain the
borrower from engaging in risky conduct that decreases the borrower's ability to repay the
loan); Triantis, supra note 5, at 235-36 (noting that issuing secured debt mitigates the nega-
tive effects of issuing new debt).
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or another, the efficient answer must take precedence over any dis-
tributive concerns.
The conflict between efficient outcomes and distributive conse-
quences goes well beyond the Article 9 debates, with warring camps
looking at their opposing numbers with sneers of derision. The spe-
cial contribution of Professor LoPucki, Professor Bebchuk, and Mr.
Fried has been to establish that the theoretical debate needed a larger
framework than simply figuring out why secured credit was efficient
and why it should therefore always take precedence over distribu-
tional concerns. They forcefully point out that the heralded efficien-
cies of secured credit might themselves be suspect. Indeed, they push
the point further, noting that there might be serious inefficiencies cre-
ated by a full priority scheme for secured creditors. Their scholarship
sets the stage for a heretical question: If the secured credit system
might be both inefficient and distributionally suspect, perhaps the
time has come to revisit its premier place in the commercial world.
III
EFFICENCY ARGUMENTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENC E
A. The Burden of Proof
Professors Harris and Mooney described Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code as "the most successful commercial statute ever
[written].'4 It is certainly well-loved, at least by those secured credi-
tors who use it. But what makes it so great?
Professors Harris and Mooney admit that, without empirical evi-
dence, it is hard to estimate the actual effects of a full priority sys-
tem. 15 There are no studies of the efficiency, distributive
consequences, or any other aspect of Article 9. No studies show who
benefits and who loses. No studies show the consequences of highly
leveraging businesses. No studies show larger economic effects of Ar-
ticle 9. Although a number of Article 9 missionaries carry the message
of Article 9 to foreign countries, as Americans have actively pushed
the adoption of a UCC-style full priority system throughout Europe,
Asia, and South America,' 6 the benefits of the system are asserted
rather than proved.
According to Harris and Mooney, however, the absence of any
empirical testing of the impact of Article 9 means that not only should
secured creditors continue to enjoy full protection, but also that both
Harris and Mooney should put their own efforts as reporters to the
14 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2021.
15 Harris & Mooney, supra, note 2, at 1350.
16 See Peter Winship, As the World Turns: Revisiting Rudolf Schlesinger's Study of the Uni-
form Commercial Code "In the Light of Comparative Law," 29 Loy. L.A_ L. REv. 1143, 1143-46
(1996).
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Article 9 revision process-and the considerable resources and pres-
tige of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law-to the task of expanding the
reach of secured creditors. Without evidence, Harris and Mooney as-
sume they should work to make it even more difficult for unsecured
creditors to challenge security interests, to leave fewer assets on the
table for the unsecured creditors to divide, and, in short, to make the
world a more comfortable place for the downtrodden class of asset-
based lenders.
Evidently there has been some sort of burden shift in the past
forty years regarding changes to the status quo. The first Article 9
Drafting Committee, headed by Professor Gilmore, devised the
scheme that made security interests in personal property cheap and
reliable. The first Committee brought order out of chaos, turning as-
sets in which no security interest could reliably be enforced at state
law into valuable collateral. For his efforts, Professor Gilmore was fea-
tured in Time magazine and achieved near-saint status in the world of
commercial law.' 7
What about the empirical questions back in the 1960s? Gilmore's
changes were heralded as "radical," "sweeping," and "monumental."18
Everyone knew the changes would promote secured lending on per-
sonal property, but no one suggested that an empirical inquiry into
the effects of such increased secured lending should precede such a
powerful change. No one asked whether such easily available security
devices would expand secured credit precipitously, foster the forma-
tion of risky businesses, dramatically increase the leverage of one class
of lenders, or disadvantage the class of unsecured creditors. Why
were these arguments not part of the debate?
Harris and Mooney remind us that those who offer change
should bear the burden of offering evidence that change is needed.
Where was the evidence just thirty-five years ago when the current sys-
tem radically reformed the state law collection system? Why do
Professors Harris and Mooney press further expansion of the priority
rights in Article 9 with no empirical examination of its effects? Do
only those who quarrel with the powerful bear the burden of produc-
17 Teacher in out of the Col, TIME, Jan. 12, 1968, at 29. For an overview of Gilmore's
accomplishments, see Anthony Jon Waters, For Grant Gilmore, 42 MD. L. REv. 865 (1983).
18 Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 27, 27 (1951) (stating that "[ n ] o other Article of the Code proposes so radical
a departure from prior law"); Richard L. Barnes, Toward a Normative Framework for the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 117, 153 (1989) (describing changes in Article 9
mechanics as "sweeping"); Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current
Law and aProposalforReform, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1061, 1073 (1992) (describing Article 9 as "a
project of monumental proportions compared to the accounts receivable statutes").
[Vol. 82:13731380
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ing empirical evidence, while those who promote their interests get a
free ride on empirical questions?
B. How Creditors Use Priority
Professors Harris and Mooney assert that empirical studies will
tell us about the costs and benefits of secured credit.' 9 They suggest
two approaches to such studies. The first is based on an analysis of
current credit practices in "market segments in which anecdotal evi-
dence and common knowledge indicate that secured credit plays an
important role."20 They suggest surveys and questionnaires, 2' but they
do not explain what the questions are. "Do you like secured credit?"
It is difficult to imagine a secured creditor dumb enough to say no,
unless the question were framed in terms of whether the creditor
could get even more protection. Nor is it possible to hypothesize an
unsecured creditor who lost a fortune while the secured creditor
walked away with all the assets of a business saying much more than
no.
Perhaps there are other items to study in the Harris and Mooney
survey, such as whether there were many failures in which the un-
secured creditors took substantial losses. But again, the question lin-
gers about what this inquiry would show. If the proportions of losses
were small, would this mean that some constraint on full priority is
unnecessary, or would it mean that some constraint would not be par-
ticularly disruptive to current business practices? Conversely, if the
unsecured creditors' losses were high, would that support or undercut
full priority? Until the hypothesis is clarified, such a study is useless.
Harris and Mooney's second empirical test is an abstract model
that "reliable data [to] inform the example"22 could fill in. Once
again, the hypothesis to be tested remains unstated. Modest constric-
tion might support either policy conclusion.
If we are to wait for law reform until these two studies are carried
out, the wait will be long. Even if the lucky day comes when someone
does these studies, it is unclear what they will tell us about the reform
process. Here lies the crucial question as the debaters keep batting
about unknown empirical assumptions: What can be learned about a
restricted priority system by studying a full priority system?
A definitive test of a restricted priority system is virtually impossi-
ble within the regime of fall priority. The behavior of the parties pro-
vides a crucial example. Some creditors will lend only on a secured
basis. Does that mean that they would not lend in a "no-priority" sys-
19 Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 1355.
20 Id. at 1358.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1360.
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tem? Not necessarily. So long as a system exists that permits others to
take priority over them, they will insist on defensive priority. In a pri-
ority system, many creditors will decide that even if they did not want
to beat out others, they must make sure that no one can beat them.
Some creditors might be satisfied with pro-rata priority, but that is
unavailable in the current scheme. Defensive security interests are es-
sential in a world that subordinates the unsecured.
This does not mean that efforts to frame empirical questions are
worthless. They are enormously useful, if only to serve as a reminder
about how little we know as we draft laws to govern billions of credit
transactions. In the Article 9 reform process, three observations about
empirical studies are important: 1) we cannot wait for the definitive
study before we make policy decisions, 2) we have to acknowledge that
any empirical evidence is likely to be indirect and only suggestive, and
3) we have to be more creative in our approaches to gathering empiri-
cal data.
C. Creative Alternatives
Professor Schwartz continues his efforts to give the definitive an-
swer to the question he posed more than a decade ago: Why have
secured credit? 23 In the latest incarnation of his answer, he focuses on
the role of negative loan covenants and the creditor's paramount con-
cern over debt dilution.24 Admirably, he looks for-and even finds-
empirical evidence consistent with his view. The creativity of his ap-
proach to looking for supporting evidence suggests that even if direct
measures of priority systems do not yield much information, indirect
measures may be quite revealing.
If Professor Schwartz is right in his view that the lender is trying
to prevent the debtor from shifting investments toward higher risk-
taking over time, and that secured debt priorities further this restric-
tion, and if his evidence is adequate to support his interpretation,
then another perspective on lending priorities might be in the offing.
But Schwartz's view of the reasons for secured debt offers a very differ-
ent perspective on the accompanying system of full priority.
If, as Schwartz suggests, secured creditors contract with reference
to the intended acquisition of future trade debt, then perhaps an effi-
cient priority system would provide a lower priority for subsequent
creditors who are not ordinary course creditors. Instead, such a sys-
tem should logically provide a first priority for routine trade credit. 25
23 Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 5, at 1-3.
24 Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1396,
1396-98 (1997).
25 Professor Schwartz draws a different conclusion from his hypothesis, placing trade
debt distribution in an inferior status to secured debt. Id. at 1397-98, 1399-1401.
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According to this view, the parties who would be bound by priorities
would be those who put the first lender at risk-the, creditors who
offer out-of-the-ordinary financing that permits the debtors to shift in-
vestment strategies. 26 Incidentally, these are also the creditors who
can best protect themselves by making informed lending decisions in
the context of subordinated priority. For those who offer only the
contemplated, routine trade debt that the secured creditor knows is
essential to the survival of the business, and who have no hand in fos-
tering subsequent risky investment decisions, perhaps first priority sta-
tus would be in order. At a minimum, the Schwartz analysis raises the
question why such trade debt should be subordinated to subsequent
lenders who also take security interests and who finance the risky busi-
ness operations that cause the trade creditors to lose out.
There is another implication from Professor Schwartz's argu-
ment: If creditors are mostly concerned about debt dilution, then it
does not follow that these creditors should take priority over tort
claimants.2 7 Tort creditors have not contributed to the subsequent
risky investments. They are, at worst, merely its co-victims. If the
point of Schwartz's analysis is to try to control the post-lending, risk-
taking decisions of debtors, there is no justification for the last-place
treatment of the victims of that risky behavior.
D. Other Places to Look for Information
The work of Professors Eisenberg and Sundgren highlights a
promising approach to the study of commercial law questions: com-
parative studies of other economies that do not use full priority
rules.28 In their study, they compare bankruptcy rules in Finland with
those in the United States. 29 In an earlier work, Professors Eisenberg
and Tagashira compared bankruptcy rules for Japan and the United
States.30 The approach is creative and yields a number of insights that
raise questions about our own system.
Perhaps somewhat closer to the question of priorities for secured
creditors would be comparisons between the United States's system
and economic regimes in Europe that provide important priorities for
parties not at the bargaining table. The French system has significant
carve outs for unsecured creditors, and the Greek, German, and Ital-
ian systems do not provide for the kind of full priority that supporters
26 These are the villains in Schwartz's analysis. Id. at 1399-1401.
27 Schwartz's only mention of tort creditors is found in footnote 2, which states that
the Article "ignores involuntary creditors such as tort claimants." Id. at 1396 n.2. His con-
clusions apply only to legal relationships between borrowers and contractual creditors. Id.
28 Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 1.
29 Id.
30 Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 117 The Evi-
dence from Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111 (1994).
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of reform carefully protect in the Article 9 drafting process.3' It is
possible that the study of other economies that have not provided the
same protection for the secured lender would yield some important
insights about whether full priority is an essential feature of business
lending.
It is unnecessary to stray so far from Philadelphia (home of the
American Law Institute) to study systems of reversed priority. Admi-
ralty law, for example, seems to support a commercially viable industry
worldwide, and yet, under this system, neither wage claimants nor tort
claimants wait behind secured lenders to recover for their injuries.3 2
The inverted admiralty priority system is well known among all credi-
tors, and there has been little cry that it causes either underinvest-
ment in the industry or that it is unworkable. Lenders insist on
adequate insurance and a sufficient showing of operating capital
before they lend, thereby internalizing labor and injury costs. It ap-
pears that the markets have adjusted smoothly to this system.33
31 See generally EUROPEAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 331 (Harry Rajak et al. eds. 1995)
(Ireland) (stating that in France, employees' claims are given priority over those of secured
creditors); Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency Act: Insolvenzordnung, 70 AM. BANmu.
L.J. 417, 434 (1996) (stating that "[tihere are no priority claims under In-
solvenzordnung") ;Jacob S. Ziegel, Canada's Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform, 70 AM. BANm.
L.J. 383, 409-10 (1996) (discussing the treatment of unpaid suppliers, farmers, and
fishermen).
32 See generally I THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw §§ 9-1 to 9-9
(2d ed. 1994) (discussing maritime liens and mortgages). Under admiralty law, tort debt
qualifies as a type of "maritime lien" which arises simultaneously with the service or occur-
rence that provides its basis. Id. § 9-1, at 484, 490. Other maritime liens include wages of
the ship's master and crew, salvage operations, preferred ship mortgages, claims for breach
of a charter party, claims under maritime contract for repairs, supplies, towage, pilotage,
and a wide variety of other "necessaries," and pollution claims. Id. at 483-85. Maritime
liens are nonconsensuai and unrecorded. See id. at 490. The creditor has the right to seize
the ship, have it sold, and seek repayment from the proceeds of the sale. See id.
Priorities among maritime liens assume significance in the event of a foreclosure and
sale of a vessel accompanied by a lack of sufficient proceeds. The order of priorities is
largely judge-made, "based on equitable considerations and the traditions of admiralty
law." Id. § 9-6, at 507. According to Schoenbaum, the generally observed rankings are:
1. Expenses ofjustice while a vessel is in custodia legis. [Such expenses
are held to be for the common benefit of the creditors.]...
2. Seamen's liens for wages, maintenance, and cure ....
3. Salvage and general average liens. [Their high ranking is based on
the theory that the claimant's efforts have preserved the vessel.]...
4. Maritime tort liens. [The purpose is to protect innocent injured
parties.]...
5. Contract liens.
Id. at 507-09. Other liens, including state created liens of a maritime nature, liens for
forfeiture, perfected nonmaritime liens, including tax liens, are subordinated to the mari-
time liens. General creditors and other claimants are last. See id. at 509.
33 For a general description of lending in the shipping industry, see Mark M. Jaffe,
Chapter 11 Strategies and Techniques-Creditors Committees, Effective Use of Plan Provisions, Objec-
tions to Confirmation, Financing a Chapter 11 Case, "Cramdown" and How It Works, 59 TUL. L.
REv. 1298 (1985).
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Causation is difficult to tease out of any empirical study. Compar-
isons across economies with hundreds of differences in both formal
laws and operative rules governing the behavior of the economic ac-
tors make it particularly difficult to link different outcomes to particu-
lar differences in the legal system. Nonetheless, it is possible that
American commercial law specialists can learn something from some-
one other than themselves. Other systems may have much to teach
about laws that foster a thriving commercial system.
IV
WHEN THE EFFICmNCy ANSWER Qurrs
There are a number of possible empirical questions that could
inform the debate on full priority. Who are the creditors who profit
from the current system, and who are those who lose? How much do
the subordinate creditors lose? What are the effects of these losses on
their businesses? What are the economy-wide effects of encouraging
overleveraged businesses to continue operations? What are the effects
of insulating secured creditors from the need to monitor the business
operations of their debtors? The list grows quickly.
Nevertheless, one empirical question drives the debate. The
question that airises again and again, both in the scholarly literature
and public debates, is whether a partial priority system would reduce
credit availability.34 The empirical question quickly turns into the em-
34 It may be universally true that creditors will claim that any provision they oppose
will cause a constriction of credit. E. Bruce Leonard, a noted Canadian practitioner and
academic, gives the following account of the Canadian debates over changes in the bank-
ruptcy laws:
[T]here were massive changes to Canada's insolvency regime in 1992. We
went from a system in which there wasn't even an automatic stay against
secured creditors to a system that has moved toward a Chapter 11 position.
In some respects... the Canadian system has additional disadvantages to
secured creditors that are not found in Chapter 11. So, in a business and
credit environment that is reasonably similar to that of the United States
(largely common law, widespread acceptance of Article 9 concepts, etc.),
there was a major shift in the position of secured creditors in
reorganizations.
We were all warned at the time that this would dramatically decrease
the amount of credit available in Canada. Serious analyses were prepared
to indicate that the multiplier effect in the contraction of credit would have
a major influence on capital development and business formation in Can-
ada. Did these predictions actually come true?
My educated guess on the issue is that they did not. I would think that
an analysis of statistics on credit availability and utilization would show a
much higher availability of commercial credit in Canada now than before
the 1992 changes. I would expect that the increase in capital availability
out-paced economic growth in Canada during the same period ....
If my suspicions are borne out by the evidence, the conclusion is pretty
obvious. The change in the Canadian system in 1992 was much more
profound and dramatic than the change that would be brought about by
the carve out proposal. I think the answer may well be that suppliers of
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pirical assertion that credit availability would diminish, thereby harm-
ing all business interests. The credit-constriction claim is the most
forceful weapon in the arsenal of the proponents of full priority.8 5
While there may be no way of testing the credit-constriction asser-
tion directly or measuring the magnitude or direction of the changes
that would occur with partial priority, it is interesting to note how the
assertion is treated as a debate stopper. If credit is reduced, the as-
sumption runs, it will hurt commercial lenders and their borrowers, as
well as their potential trade creditors. It will even threaten a robust
economy.
The argument proves too much. If the only test of any part of a
commercial law system were whether it promoted or constricted
credit, then our system would look very different. Why not return to
the days of debt servitude? There were efficiency concerns about ser-
vitude, but the bottom line was that servitude made credit available to
people who otherwise could not obtain it. Nonetheless, it was gone by
the early 1800s. 36
If the goal of a commercial law system is expansion of credit, then
perhaps the revisions of Article 9 should reflect changes in medical
technology since the 1960s. Why not permit security interests in body
parts? Any debtor who promised her liver or her heart would surely
have strong incentives to perform on the loan. It would be possible to
restrict security interests to body parts that leave the debtor dimin-
ished, but alive, such as offering a kidney, skin for a graft, a womb, or
a cornea as collateral. It appears that the expansion of credit notion
has not been embraced fully.
The idea here is not to give the current Article 9 drafters new
ideas. Instead, the point is to note that even if a security device pro-
motes lending, reasons not to support it may exist. Some of the rea-
sons may be grounded in efficiency arguments. Some may be naked
applications of paternalism. Some of the arguments may refer to com-
munity sensibilities and fairness. These concepts may be hard to
credit are able to thrive under virtually any system: they only need to have a
fair and logical system of rules in place under which they can confidently
operate.
Letter from E.B. Leonard, Cassels Brock & Blackwell, to the author, 1-2 (Apr. 4, 1997) (on
file with author). Mr. Leonard then develops the thesis that one-lender models produce
less lending and less capital investment than multiple-lender models. Id.
35 In defending their work, Harris and Mooney rely heavily on the purported diminu-
tion in financing. Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 1356-63. Although Baird does not
argue in favor of full priority, he expresses concern that the costs of a project not begun
because an entrepreneur could not get financing be included in any cost/benefit calculus.
Baird, supra note 1, at 1420-21.
36 See PETERJ. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISON-
MENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 41, 77, 138, 147 n.11, 164-65, 218-19
(1974).
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quantify in an equation full of sigmas and betas, but they have to do
with our collective confidence in the commercial law system.
Even when the discussion is solely about money, the argument
that full priority is justified whenever it promotes more lending still
proves too much. Taxing authorities often take priority over secured
lenders. For example, if property taxes are not paid, the government
can foreclose on the property, hold a sale, and demand first distribu-
tion from the sale.3 7 In other cases, the government agrees to come
second behind perfected secured creditors,3 8 even when such ar-
rangements upset the priority scheme established in Article 9.39
Surely such priority disturbances constrict credit extension. What
lender would not claim that it would lend more, if only it did not risk
being primed by a government authority?
In addition to the federal tax laws, state laws abound with priori-
ties that permit certain protected groups to take priority over secured
creditors. Statutory liens for everyone from automobile repair per-
sons,40 to launderers,41 to cattle feed suppliers, 42 may trump the rights
of the secured creditor. The full priority system gives full priority
against only the unfavored groups who failed to persuade a legislature
to pass a friendly statutory lien.
37 See LYNN M. LoPucKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
759-72 (1995).
38 See generally I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323 (1994) (providing the statutory framework for fed-
eral tax liens). Sections 6321 and 6322 govern the creation and duration of federal tax
liens. Section 6323 provides exceptions to the "first in time, first in right" priority rules.
Several of the provisions provide protection to those who lend money after the lien is filed.
See id § 6323(b) (granting some statutory liens priority over federal tax liens, even when
those statutory liens arise after the federal tax lien is filed); id. § 6323(c) (2) (A), (C) (giving
advances secured by commercial financing security, accounts, inventory, chattel paper, and
mortgage paper made by the lender within 45 days after filing of the tax lien priority over
the tax lien); id. § 6323(c) (4) (protecting lenders under obligatory disbursement agree-
ments); id. § 6323(d) (protecting future advances made by secured creditors against fed-
eral tax liens); id. § 6323(e) (giving nonadvances equivalent protection against intervening
tax liens).
39 See LoPuci & WARREN, supra note 37, at 776. The authors state:
While this preexisting system of perfection and priority based on the princi-
ple of "first in time, first in right" is in most respects consistent and coher-
ent, it is not entirely so. As our consideration of federal tax liens illustrates,
the rules governing this system are made by different governing bodies and
typically regulate competitions one by one. That is, they do not tell us the
priority of A in relation to other liens. Instead, one rule tells us that A has
priority over B and another, perhaps written and enacted by different bod-
ies at different times, may tell us that B has priority over C. It is not safe to
assume from these two rules that A will have priority over C: The rules may
simply be inconsistent.
Id.
40 E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3801 (West 1964).
41 E.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1021.01(A) (West Supp. 1996).
42 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 713.50 - 713.65 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
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Federal bankruptcy law is the ultimate partial priority system.
The rights accorded the trustee in bankruptcy to stop foreclosure and
repossession, to strip down security interests, and to distribute the
debtor's remaining assets pro rata in contravention of a security agree-
ment, create perhaps the most frequently encountered partial priority
scheme in commercial law. A few scholars would like to see bank-
ruptcy laws amended to permit parties to contract out of bankruptcy,
and thereby contract into the full priority scheme of Article 9.43
Nonetheless, the idea has attracted little attention outside the rarified
atmosphere of academia.
The incursions on priority in tax law, in statutory liens, and in
bankruptcy, make clear that fostering as much lending as possible is
not the only goal of any commercial law system. The goal is always
one of balance. Taxing authorities get priorities, in part because of a
judgment that a business that cannot meet its tax obligations should
not be operating. Cattle feed suppliers get a priority, in part because
they add value in a way that makes it virtually impossible for them to
take a protected interest through any other method. Employees may
take priority because they are poor risk spreaders. And so on. Bank-
ruptcy law takes precedence over contractual agreements, in part be-
cause the rights of third parties to pro rata distribution at liquidation
cannot be negotiated away without consent.
The ultimate question is not whether a partial priority scheme
might cause some constriction in lending. That empirical question
remains open, although there are strong arguments both to refute
and to support the idea that available total credit would remain the
same. The real question is how the efficiency arguments, even if they
were unambiguously true, stack up against other considerations.
V
OTHER COSTS TO CONSIDER
Debates over the Carve Out Proposal have prompted a spirited
dispute over who should bear the costs of full priority and whether
those costs should be internalized to the operation of a business.44 I
will not repeat those arguments here, notwithstanding my own strong
views on how they should influence the policy debates. I made my
43 See Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules, 67
S. CAL. L. REv. 1107 (1994); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel,Jr., The Economic Analy-
sis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 Am. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 85 (1995).
44 See Lisa M. Bossetti & Mette H. Kurth, Professor Elizabeth Warren's Article 9 Carve-Out
Proposal: A Strategic Analysis, 30 UCC L.J. 3 (1997); Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the
Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposa4 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1466 (1997);
Jeffrey S. Turner, The Broad Scope of Revised Article 9 IsJustified, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
328 (1996); Hugh Ray, Losing 20 Percent of Your Lien-Automatically, TEx. LAW., June 10,
1996, at 26.
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position unambiguously dear when I delivered a draft of a carve out
provision to the Council of the American Law Institute after the Arti-
cle 9 Drafting Committee refused to give the Council a model provi-
sion they might consider. Instead of repeating that debate here, I
offer instead a few speculations about the consequences of the Article
9 priority system we have created.
Any legal rule will cause some redistribution of wealth. A rule of
ownership, a rule of liability, or a rule of priority will relatively advan-
tage or disadvantage competing parties. In Article 9, no one disputes
that a rule of full priority will advantage commercial lenders and dis-
advantage tort creditors. Trade creditors are in a more ambiguous
position. Some may be fully adjusting creditors, so that they are indif-
ferent to the choice of priority systems. Others may be nonadjusting
in short-run pricing, but more interested in seeing new businesses fi-
nanced which will provide new markets for their goods. Still others
may be nonadjusting and unable to survive the impact of overlever-
aged customers that fail without paying their bills. Employees may be
in a similarly ambiguous position. They need capital formation to
produce jobs, but they are generally unable to adjust to (or, in some
cases, even to monitor) the extent of their employers' ability to make
promised contributions to their pension funds and to meet other fi-
nancial obligations. Thus, in a full-priority system, secured creditors
win, trade creditors and employees may win or lose, and tort victims
lose.
What is remarkable about the Article 9 system is the consistent
direction of the redistributive impulse. To the extent that the rules
create any redistribution among creditors of a failing business, the sys-
tem directs resources away from creditors who are involuntary, under-
represented, and least able to spread their losses. Instead, value is
directed toward lenders who are entirely voluntary, best able to pro-
tect their rights, and best able to spread their risks among numerous
projects. This is a remarkable step in American commercial law,
made all the more remarkable by its support from such august institu-
tions as the American Law Institute.
A second implication of the full priority system is also worth con-
sidering. The power of secured creditors is apparent even in the insti-
tutions that serve to equalize distributions among creditors. A full
priority system of secured credit permits some creditors to make a par-
tial opt out from the bankruptcy system. The impulse that equity-is-
equality in bankruptcy takes shape in the analogy between failing busi-
nesses and sinking ships.45 The impulse to salvage whatever can be
45 See Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 5, at 968 n.248. According to Scott:
The basic principle underlying general average is that if a vessel loaded with
valuable cargo should founder at sea, the captain may-make necessary sacri-
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salvaged is paramount, and the distribution of benefits and losses falls
pro rata on all those who entrusted their cargo to the now-failing ship.
Bankruptcy adopts this approach, but carves out a huge exception for
the secured creditor.
Notwithstanding the features of bankruptcy that curtail the power
of the secured creditor, the ability of the secured creditor to demand
adequate protection and to insist on a priority repayment of assets
effectively gives the secured creditor the power to block a reorganiza-
tion.46 If the creditors collectively might be better off with the busi-
ness as a going concern, secured creditors can nonetheless insist on
liquidation, unless they receive their statutorily protected treatment.47
Every strengthening of the secured creditors' rights outside of bank-
ruptcy redounds to a more lopsided distribution inside bankruptcy.
In bankruptcy, the warring nature of the creditors-secured ver-
sus unsecured-comes to the foreground. Secured creditors want
their assets now, even if it means killing a going concern. They battle
with unsecured creditors, who view the remaining assets as a last-ditch
chance to recover something for the value they contributed to the
business. Priority creates a conflict among the parties dealing with a
failing debtor. It deflects the parties from the goal of reorganiza-
tion-enhancing the total value of the business. With priority, the
parties do not work together to make certain that whenever liquida-
tion or reorganization could squeeze more value from a debtor busi-
ness, the money is in fact squeezed out. If all creditors shared on a
pro rata basis in bankruptcy, one can only speculate on how the focus
of bankruptcy reform might be redirected.
A better, more effective Article 9 would simply favor secured cred-
itors over unsecured creditors at the expense of a collective determi-
nation of what steps produce the greatest value for all creditors. The
effects of this point are felt as much in negotiation as in formal law.
To the extent that bankruptcy reorganizations proceed by agreement
among claimants, every move to make the priority of security interests
more complete, to insulate them from errors in filing or failures in
documentation, and to enhance the scope of the property the agree-
ment covers means that the parties negotiating in the combined
shadow of Article 9 and bankruptcy will settle on arrangements that
give more to secured creditors and less to the unsecured. This means,
at the margin, fewer reorganizations or sales of going concerns will
fices of the cargo or the vessel to prevent the ship and cargo from sinking
altogether. All parties involved in the voyage will contribute to the general
average expense according to their percentages of ownership.
Id.
46 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 506(c), 1129(a) (9) (1994).
47 See§ 1129(a)(9).
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occur, even when such approaches would yield the highest value to
the creditors collectively.
There are other broad policy implications of full priority. When
well-organized, amply-funded lenders can opt out of the baseline
debtor-creditor system (the state-law "race of diligence"), there must
be some effect on the development of that collection system. At a
time when most creditors relied only on the ordinary state-law collec-
tion system, did the system offer a fair opportunity for creditors to be
heard, for debtors to air their cases, and for judges to consider ques-
tions thoughtfully and fully? Some historical evidence suggests that
the system did.48 As the powerful players opted out of this system, and
relied on priority agreements and self-help, what has become of the
state collection system? Practices are arcane, costs are prohibitive, and
much of the courts' business is the routine administration of confes-
sions ofjudgments against unrepresented debtors, rather than the ef-
fective enforcement of creditors' rights.49
If the powerful players were forced to use the ordinary debt col-
lection system, would the system look different? Would the Wall Street
Journal write exposes of court delays and poor collection practices that
a hopelessly outdated system fosters? Would the American Law Insti-
tute commit considerable resources to revising and streamlining the
system? Would law professors put their enormous talents and creativ-
ity into creating models for the merchant courts that were the dreams
of Karl Llewellyn? Maybe not, but the thought experiment is
entertaining.
Another consequence of the full priority system is the frequent
incursion of statutory liens that increasingly undercut it. As secured
creditors grab more assets and finance more businesses that operate
on ever-thinner margins, groups of unsecured creditors have organ-
ized for their own revenge. State laws are now choked with special-
interest liens.50 Sometimes the liens trump the Article 9 security inter-
ests, and sometimes they serve only to put the favored group ahead of
the mob of unsecured creditors.51 In any case, the new laws result
from straight power politics. There is little principled guidance to ex-
plain why one group gets a lien and another does not. The effect, of
course, is to undo the universal and facially neutral balance of the
uniform commercial laws, substituting a grab bag of special inter-
48 For a discussion about debt litigation in the colonial era and a description of the
speed and responsiveness of the legal system, see generally BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS
AND STRANGERS: LAWv AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CoNNECrIcUr 11-46 (1987).
49 See William J. Woodward, Jr., New Judgment Liens on Personal Property: Does "Efficient"
Mean "Better"?, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1-2 (1990).
50 See supra notes 4042 and accompanying text.
51 See LoPuciu & WARREN, supra note 37, at 743-50 (discussing the relative priority of
statutory liens and security interests).
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ests.52 In the world of every group for itself, the groups not repre-
sented decline in number and fall further and further behind the rest
of the creditors as they are left to fight over the smaller and smaller
bones that remain.
Partial priority would not eliminate the conflicts and concerns
raised here, but adherents to a full priority system must pause to con-
sider other ramifications of making creditors' conflicts with each
other sharper than their conflicts with the debtor.
VI
BUT THE CosTs ARE UNAVOIDABLE
Professor Baird embraces the idea that policymakers should con-
sider distributive considerations as well as efficiency concerns. 53 How-
ever, he expresses concern that any move to limit the rights of secured
creditors might result in secured creditors' simply redoubling their
efforts to move assets out of the reach of unsecured creditors through
other means. 54 Professor LoPucki takes a stronger view of this posi-
tion in his doomsday piece, The Death of Liability,55 in which he con-
cludes that the combination of computers, global communication,
and creativity means that no company need subject itself to any liabil-
ity if it merely structures its deals in such a way as to avoid paying
unsecured creditors.56
The argument is a fair one. What is the point of changing the law
if well-informed parties can slip around it with ease? The fact that
some people may escape does not mean that policymakers should be
indifferent between endorsing parties' ability to tie up all the assets of
a business and indicating that the parties should count on some bal-
anced distribution between secured and unsecured creditors. The
failure to make this choice is to embrace, as a policy matter, one
group of well-positioned creditors over all others. That policy state-
ment is significant, both in the interpretation of case law and in the
52 Secured creditors have begun to awaken to the fact that security interests can be
threatened by statutory liens. They have enlisted the American Bar Association to recom-
mend that statutory liens be brought within the ambit of Article 9. See Inclusion of Nonpos-
sessoy Statutory Liens in Article 9, 1996 A.B.A. Bus. L. SEC. 2 (draft copy, on file with author).
To make the move politically palatable, they suggest such liens retain priority over all other
unsecured creditors. See id. As for carve outs from the interests of secured creditors, how-
ever, they are clear: Article 9 priority remains triumphant. See id. A statutory lien should
beat an Article 9 lien only if the creditor filed the interest ahead of the secured creditor-
effectively transforming it into another Article 9 security interest. See id. The apparent
intent of the move is to undercut the expansion of statutory liens into the territory domi-
nated by secured creditors.
53 Baird, supra note 1, at 1420, 1426-28.
54 Id. at 1433-34.
55 LoPucki, supra note 11.
56 Id.
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ultimate development of other laws governing commercial
transactions.
The problem of shielding assets is a quickly emerging issue for
the commercial-law world. Asset securitization, an unknown concept
a few years ago, now flourishes as a tool in certain lending transactions
to "bankruptcy-proof' security interests.57 Commercial law may sup-
port such moves or may eventually conclude that these efforts are in-
appropriate. Similar to the manner by which the common law
developed the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil when compa-
nies began to use the corporate form to foist losses onto their victims,
both courts and legislatures may become more willing to consider en-
terprise liability to govern the activities of large business entities.58
This Article is not the place to replicate the vigorous debates else-
where in business and corporate law about whether companies' ability
to escape liability should be curtailed, and what are the best methods
for curbing these efforts.59 However, this Article is the place to say
that the issue is one worthy of concern in determining how to draft a
commercial law provision, but it should not be an argument for failing
to do whatever a policymaker believes is right.
VII
How TO DECIDE
For many years, commercial law has been as riven with the notion
of "theory versus practice" as any other area of law. Conferences such
as this one demonstrate that the dichotomy is false. Today, the theo-
rists among us have begun to frame empirical questions, while the
most practice-oriented argue the theoretical foundations of their
positions.
Although today's commercial law debates are better than those of
the past, they have not yet reached nirvana. Data are not available to
inform the debates. The efficiency disputes remain unresolved. Law
revision cannot wait for academics to resolve their disputes. In the
face of deep conflicts and imperfect information, perhaps an ap-
proach based on a litigation model would be fruitful.
57 See generally Marsha E. Simms, Asset Securitization, in ASSET-BASED FINANCING, at 321
(PLI Com. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 739, 1996); Robert R. Veach, Jr.,
Securitization of Assets, 30 BuLL. Bus. L. SEC. ST. B. TEX. 23 (1993).
58 Professor Blumberg has been pushing for this move for several years. PHiLLP I.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, §§ 1.03, 2.01-2.14 (1985).
59 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL I. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCT'URE OF
CORPORATE LAW 61-62 (1991) (considering whether involuntary unsecured creditors
should be able to sue management); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Un-
limited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879, 1933-34 (1991) (arguing
that involuntary unsecured creditors should be permitted to pierce the corporate veil); S.
Shavell, TheJudgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L RFV. L. & ECON. 45, 54 (1986) (requiring firms
to provide adequate insurance to cover their tort victims).
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The presumption underlying common-law decisionmaking is that
the best outcome over time is likely to be reached when two well-in-
formed parties who have a stake in the outcome make their best possi-
ble arguments to a neutral decisionmaker. No one case may be
perfectly decided, but our system is founded on the belief that the
two-disputants model will get us to the right decision more often than
not.
That lesson is instructive here. Full priority rules have created
two classes of interested parties-those who profit and those who lose
from a full-priority regime. The group that profits from priority is
well-funded and active, fully represented in all the policy debates and
in the decisionmaking bodies. Their representatives are present at
every drafting committee meeting and debate on the subject. If
they-and all their academic supporters-make a persuasive case,
they should win. But if they do not, then the party who has not had
the opportunity to make its case should win. In the case of a tie, the
unfunded, the unheard, and the unorganized should be declared the
winners.
It is difficult to know what is missing from this debate about prior-
ity. The lawyers of commercial lenders ably explain their views about
how a shift away from full priority will cause their clients to alter their
lending practices and constrict credit, thereby hurting all businesses.
They amass testimonial letters60 and do not lack for supporters. Rhe-
torical devices flourish.61 Professors Harris and Mooney even play a
race card in the debates. 62
If utility companies were equal partners in the debates, what
might they say about their ability to adjust their prices to account for
60 In his role as the ABA Advisor to the Article 9 Drafting Committee, Steven 0. Weise
collected 25 responses to a request for comments on the Carve Out Proposal. Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9 Revision: Comments on Professor Warren's Proposal, Col-
lected by Steven 0. Weise, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe 2 (on file with author). He
sent a full set of those responses to the Drafting Committee and officials of the American
Law Institute. With the exception of three lone academics-one who favored the Carve
Out Proposal, one who criticized it, and one who did not draw a conclusion-all the au-
thors who identified their professional affiliations said they worked with secured creditors.
No one said they received their business from unsecured creditors, trade debt, employees,
or tort victims.
61 One letter expressed the suspicion that there was "another agenda behind the pro-
posal-such as plaintiff lawyer fees." But the author generously conceded that this re-
sponse was "too cynical a view." Memorandum from Richard B. Smith to Steve 0. Weise I
(June 4, 1996) (on file with author). In the compendium of letters amassed by the Draft-
ing Committee, there were not any letters from tort lawyers.
62 Harris and Mooney state: "For example, data may confirm that small businesses
(and, accordingly, minority-owned businesses) would disproportionately comprise that
group [that would face constriction of credit]." Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 1371.
Their support? Anecdotal evidence. Id. n.95. This argument can be rephrased to say that
banks want full priority to help their minority friends. Some critics may demand more
than anecdotes to support this proposition.
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their subordinate position when a debtor fails? What might suppliers
say about their own business failures when their over-leveraged cus-
tomers consume their goods and services, then hand over all their
assets to commercial lenders when they collapse? What might employ-
ees say about their efforts to support a Chapter 11 reorganization that
is thwarted by a commercial lender who has the right to sell off all the
hard assets of an intact business? What might tort victims say about
businesses that remained operational without adequate insurance or
capital, producing the goods and providing the services that injured
them?
Until we know all the stories from all sides, until all the empirical
evidence is in, until one theoretical approach predominates, it might
be appropriate to hesitate to expand the reach of commercial lenders.
Only one party dominates the debate, but the case for full priority
remains unproven. In such circumstances, it would not be precipitous
to consider rebalancing the playing field to offer something to the
unrepresented.
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